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critics of divine coercive power and the cognate idea of divine omnipotence have been Whitehead and Hartshorne. McLaughlin's apparent comfortableness with the concept of divine omnipotence (p. 49) is at odds with his best insights in Chapter 4, I think. Elohim does not create out of violence (p. 92), but rather lures free creatures toward the good life. And the good life will not be illuminated to any great degree by Schweitzer's refusal to make any morally relevant distinctions among the sorts of lives that are found in nature (p. 151). That is, if *every* life is equally sacred, then the tsetse fly is as valuable as the child who is about to get bit by it. This result is counterintuitive in the extreme. Further, if creatures have some power of their own, then no being, not even the greatest conceivable one, could have all power.

In any event, McLaughlin is to be commended by ending his book with the observation that if possession of enhanced rationality is justificatory warrant for inflicting suffering and death of others, then we had all better hope that God does not treat us the way that we have historically treated nonhuman animals (p. 154).

Trash Animals: How We Live with Nature's Filthy, Feral, Invasive, and Unwanted Species. Edited by Kelsi Nagy and Phillip David Johnson II. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2013. 320 pp. Paperback. $17.38. ISBN: 978-0-8166-8055-9.)

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In March 2012, PBS aired a documentary entitled "Raccoon Nation" as part of its series *Nature*. This film combines rare footage of raccoon escapades and interviews with scientists and animal-control personnel to explore the purported theory that human beings, in an effort to outwit raccoons in urban environments, are actually inadvertently encouraging their adaptation and evolution. This fascinating documentary has unquestionable merits in informing about raccoon life. Yet, "Raccoon Nation" also communicates a general sense of threat inherent in raccoons, almost apocalyptically predicting their eventual conquest of human cities, by feeding on humans' ever-present (and ever-growing) refuse. This sense of menace is conveyed mostly through the association between raccoons and garbage: a link made very clear from the very beginning of the documentary when the narrator claims that "we think of them as little garbage cans" (Fleming, 2012) and we see in the film several animals ravaging plastic bags full of trash.

The main objective of the anthology *Trash Animals: How We Live with Nature's Filthy, Feral, Invasive, and Unwanted Species* is to challenge this disputable association between nonhuman animals and (human) waste by investigating "not only the implications of calling an animal 'trash' but also what we can understand about the personal and cultural phenomenon of the trash animal" (p. 3). According to the editors, Kelsi Nagy and Phillip David Johnson II, the first reason behind such association belongs to the economic development of our capitalist societies. Still used nowadays by fur trappers, the term "trash" appears, in fact, to describe an animal "as worthless, useless, and disposable" (p. 4), none of which are inherent qualities of an animal itself but rather characteristics of how we relate to certain animals on a purely economic level. However, it is the overall negative value we usually associate with trash that truly determines the reactions we have when facing certain creatures, reactions usually ranging from disgust to fear or anger. The question that *Trash Animals* tries to answer, then, is about the perception of some nonhuman animals as filthy, worthless, and despised creatures that are constant menaces to our economic and psychological well-being. However, according to Nagy and Johnson, "human relationships with animals, even animals that seem ecologically or economically worthless (oftentimes, a harmful assumption) or that do us harm, can be imagined in new ways. And if we can see animals in a different light, our ethics of engagement will certainly follow" (p. 11).

This is the epistemological and ethical goal of this collection of essays. As Randy Malamud maintains in the foreword, it is indeed necessary to interrogate and reconfigure our stereotypes about nonhuman animals. The essays gathered in *Trash Animals* would then "help us to think about what it means to denigrate an animal—why we might be inclined to have done so in the first place, and why it might be more intelligent, more responsible to stop doing so" (p. xii). Unfortunately, such a statement corresponds only partially to the reality of the book as a whole. The remarkable originality of *Trash Animals* and the attempt of the editors to systematize this new direction of studies are in fact weakened by its heterogeneous nature, fluctuating between nonfiction literature and scientific scholarship. This indeterminacy has mainly two consequences. First, some of the essays have been written specifically for the publication in the book while others were first published more than 20 years ago. This disparity does not aid readers in grasping the current perception of "trash" animals and the present conditions of our multifaceted relationships with them. For instance, I was puzzled by the significance of incorporating an otherwise interesting article on the "management" of gray wolves published in 1990 only to add a short note in which the editors maintain that the controversy has undergone significant changes since then (pp. 39, 65–66). Would it not have been better to have provided a new, original study capable of mapping the entire debate and its recent developments?

Second, and most importantly, while usually in favor of interdisciplinary investigations and wide-ranging analyses, I feel instead that the essays collected in *Trash Animals* are too uneven. They wander from accurate reconstructions of the cultural reasons behind certain fears or repulsions (Roberston's "Managing Apocalypse"), to the still thought-provoking investigation of "avicultural hegemony" (Mitchell's "The Bard's Bird"), to what I would define as narrative essays about the authors' personal encounters with the allegedly problematic animals (Branch's "Nothing Says Trash like Packrats" or Blechman's "Flying Rats," just to name a few). It is not that these last essays are not well written or stimulating: In a different context, that is to say as pure "stories," they would fit perfectly. Rather, the problem is that they appeal to a subjectivity, a sensibility, a reason, and, finally, a methodology that may be tangential but does not correspond to those standards that I believe should be behind accurate scholarship. For instance, what knowledge about the ethical dimension of our relationships with "trash" animals do we achieve from reading an extensive account of family background (pp. 70–71) or the very touching but very personal dilemmas told at the end of the book (pp. 284–290)?

To conclude, as most of the University of Minnesota Press volumes devoted to human-animal relationships and environmental issues do, I believe that the ideas and the purposes behind *Trash Animals* are not only original but unquestionably praiseworthy. We cannot but agree with Nagy and Johnson that "instead of vilifying the creatures that thrive in this increasingly urbanized and polluted environment, it behooves to us to first understand how we have participated in its creation and how we might go about improving our shared world while we can" (p. 25). However, for future explorations on the same subject I would also recommend more editorial accuracy. Our ethical commitment to nonhuman animals should, in fact, begin with paying attention to the ethics of discourse, whether it concerns the terms we use to describe raccoons or editing a book that *homogeneously* fulfills what should be vigorous standards of scholarship.

Reference

Fleming, S. K. (Director). (2012). Raccoon nation. [Television series episode]. In J. Young (Supervising Producer), *Nature*. New York, NY: WNET. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/episodes/raccoon-nation/full-episode/7558/

Animal Rights Without Liberation. By Alasdair Cochrane. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012. 246+viii pp. Paperback. $29.50. ISBN: 978-0-2311-5827-5.)

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Much of the animal ethics discourse since the 1970s has been dominated by moral theorizing that can be described as either utilitarian or neo-Kantian. Peter Singer, in his 1975 book, *Animal Liberation*, exposed the immense suffering nonhuman animals are subjected to in research laboratories and factory farms and set off a wave of academic and popular interest in the question of what we owe to other animals. Singer demands, I think rightly, that similar interests are given similar weight in ethical deliberation, regardless of the species of the interest bearer, and identifies the maximization of interest satisfaction as the proper goal of morality. The implications of Singer's view are as sweeping as they are radical: If the interests of nonhuman animals and our interests are to be given equal consideration, then modern animal agriculture and most animal testing are nothing short of a moral catastrophe of the highest order. Yet, moral philosophers such as Tom Regan (1983) and Gary L. Francione (1995) object that Singer's utilitarianism does not go far enough, as it prohibits the use of nonhuman animals only if it fails to maximize utility and, hence, does not provide sufficient protection for the individual. They instead call for the total abolition of the exploitation of animals in agriculture, science, and entertainment. Animal rights, as they understand them, require that animals in farms, laboratories, zoos, and circuses be *liberated*.

Alasdair Cochrane, in this well-argued and carefully written book, opens up a conceptual space between these poles that are often falsely assumed to form a dichotomy. He presents a novel theory of animal rights, without liberation and based entirely on the interests of sentient animals. Cochrane argues that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness and well-being is at once necessary and sufficient for the