

ARTICLE

Companions in guilt arguments

Christopher Cowie 

University of Durham

CorrespondenceChristopher Cowie, Department of
Philosophy, University of Durham, Durham,
UK.

Email: christopher.d.cowie@durham.ac.uk

Abstract

Arguments for some controversial positions in metaethics—typically moral scepticism or the moral error theory—are sometimes thought to overreach. They appear to entail sceptical or error-theoretic views about non-moral branches of thought in a sense that is costly or implausible. If this is true, those metaethical arguments should be rejected. This is the companions in guilt strategy in metaethics. In this article, the contemporary use of the companions in guilt strategy is explored and assessed. The methodology of the strategy is discussed, and criteria for assessing specific instances of its use are identified. Prominent instances of its use in the contemporary literature are then examined. The focus is on those that take (a) epistemic judgment, (b) prudential judgment, and (c) mathematical judgment as “companions,” with a view to undermining the moral error theory and moral scepticism, respectively.

1 | INTRODUCTION

Some metaethical arguments claim to undermine the good standing of morality. Examples include arguments for moral scepticism or for an error theory of moral judgment. An increasingly popular way of responding to these arguments is to show that they *overreach*: They undermine the good standing of some *non-moral* subject matter in a costly or implausible fashion. One might show, for example, that arguments for moral scepticism entail *mathematical* scepticism. Or one might show that arguments for the moral error theory entail an error theory about *epistemic* judgment. To the extent that these consequences are costly or implausible, the metaethical arguments have *overreached*. So we should reject them.

This is the *companions in guilt strategy* (CIG) in metaethics. There has been a great deal of recent work on its use, particularly in response to the new wave of moral error theories. In this article, I provide an opinionated guide to some of it. I begin (Section 2) by detailing the strategy and providing criteria for assessing specific instances of it. I then assess two kinds of CIG strategy. Firstly (Sections 3–5), I assess those that take non-moral, normative

judgments—epistemic, prudential, and aesthetic judgments—as a companion. Secondly (Section 6), I assess those that take mathematical judgment as a companion.

2 | METHODOLOGY OF CIG ARGUMENTS

I begin with some methodological remarks about how CIG arguments should be characterised and assessed, and why we should care about them.

2.1 | Characterising CIG arguments

We can usefully distinguish between two types of CIG argument: *by analogy* and *by entailment* (Lillehammer, 2007).

Analogy-based arguments work by drawing an analogy between moral judgment and some non-moral judgment type. Consider an example. Moral judgment is the subject of widespread disagreement. Suppose that this leads some philosopher to conclude that there are no moral facts. This conclusion is an obvious target of a CIG argument by analogy. Many non-moral judgment types are also the subject of widespread disagreement, for example, religious judgments. So if widespread *moral* disagreement warrants denial of moral facts, then it surely warrants denial of facts about *religious* matters too. But the consequent of this conditional is independently costly or implausible (God either exists or does not). So we should reject its antecedent too.

There are other ways in which metaethical arguments can overreach. It is sometimes claimed, for example, that ordinary scientific practice presupposes that there are moral facts (Putnam, 2002).¹ If this is true, then arguments for the moral error theory would undermine the good standing of ordinary scientific practice. This is plausibly an *overreach* too. Yet it is not based on any analogy between moral judgments and scientific judgments. Rather, it is based on a *non-analogical dependence relation* between moral judgment and its companion. Arguments that take this form are CIG arguments by entailment.

My focus will be on CIG arguments by analogy, though I note that (a) there are important CIG arguments by entailment and (b) there are important CIG arguments that are a hybrid of entailment and analogy.²

2.2 | Assessing CIG arguments

There are two basic questions that we need to bear in mind when assessing the effectiveness of a specific CIG argument.

1 The companionship question

Is the proposed “companion” for moral judgment *really* a companion? The answer is “yes” if and only if the problematic feature of moral judgment that motivates the error theoretic or sceptical argument (e.g., being the subject of widespread disagreement) is shared by the non-moral companion.

2 The costliness question

How costly or implausible it would be, should the good standing of the companion be undermined? The greater the cost, the stronger the argument. A CIG argument that entails that, for example, nothing exists, or that we know nothing of the external world is stronger than a CIG argument that entails a less drastic, or counter-intuitive conclusion.

The answers to these questions determine whether the CIG argument is a good one. This can be a matter of degree, and a matter of controversy. I illustrate this using specific examples below.

2.3 | What's the attraction of CIG arguments

Why would one argue via the CIG strategy rather than take a more direct approach to rebutting challenges to the moral error theory, moral scepticism, or to the good standing of moral judgment more generally?

The most obvious reason is that the CIG strategy is *dialectically* very strong. It does not directly contest the specific premises of the metaethical argument against which it is targeted. Rather, it teases out the non-moral consequences of that argument; consequences that all parties can assess independently of their metaethical commitments.

Secondly, the CIG strategy gives us some stable ground from which to assess views in metaethics. Often arguments in metaethics are extremely complex. Assessing them can be very difficult, and the rules of the game are not always clear. The CIG strategy promises some stable ground. If we see, for example, that sceptical arguments in metaethics generalise to mathematics, or logic, or epistemology, we have an obvious reason to treat them with suspicion.

CIG strategies also have weaknesses. Firstly, they don't provide a *positive* account of moral metaphysics or epistemology. They merely show that some philosophical arguments for (e.g.) sceptical or error-theoretic views fail. Secondly, even if they succeed in showing that these arguments fail, they fail to show *why* or *where* they fail. Thirdly, CIG arguments can be read as *modus tollens* or *modus ponens*. Suppose that one offers a CIG argument against the moral error theory by arguing that if it is true, then a mathematical error theory is true too. A sufficiently stubborn moral error theorist may simply take this as a good reason to be a mathematical error theorist.

3 | THE EPISTEMIC ANALOGY AGAINST MORAL ERROR THEORY

There are many CIG arguments, developing different candidate companions in response to different metaethical arguments (Lillehammer, 2007). A survey is beyond the scope of the present article. I focus on those CIG arguments that have figured prominently in the recent literature, beginning with those that have been used in combatting the new wave of moral error theorists. These arguments have tended to focus on non-moral, normative judgments as companions. The most high-profile example focuses on *epistemic judgment*. This strategy was influentially stated by Terence Cuneo (2007) as part of his book *The Normative Web*. It has since been the subject of much scrutiny.³ The details of the argument depend on how, exactly, the argument for the moral error theory is formulated. There are two primary formulations.

According to the first formulation, moral judges are committed to the existence of categorical, normative reasons (Joyce, 2001, 2006, 2011). Categorical reasons are reasons that one possesses whatever one's desires. If, for example, I judge that I morally ought not to kill the innocent, then, plausibly *whatever I desire*, I am committed to the existence of some reason not to kill the innocent. Furthermore, these reasons are *genuinely normative* or binding. In this they are unlike the merely "institutional" or "norm-relative" reasons for compliance generated by the rules of (e.g.) sports, games, and etiquette.

Epistemic judges seem equally likely to possess these commitments. When one judges that it would be justifiable to believe a proposition in light of one's evidence, one is plausibly thereby committed to that evidence constituting a reason to believe that proposition whatever one's desires. So epistemic judges are committed to categorical reasons. These reasons are often thought to be genuinely normative or binding too (Bedke, 2010; Cuneo, 2007; Das, 2016, 2017; Rowland, 2013, 2016). Putting these two thoughts together, we get:

- A. If moral judges are committed to categorical, genuinely normative reasons, then so are epistemic judges.

It would follow that "categoricity-based" arguments for the moral error theory would generalise to an epistemic error theory.

It is, however, increasingly popular to formulate the moral error theory in slightly different terms: in terms of the commitments of moral judgers to the existence of *irreducibly normative relations* (Olson, 2014; Streumer, 2017). These are normative relations (such as the reason-relation or favouring-relation) that cannot be reductively identified with non-normative relations. Why think that moral judgers are committed to such things? One simple reason is that the most obvious reductions of normative relations are to either (a) desire-promotion relations or (b) that of being prescribed by some purely conventional system of norms (Olson, 2014).⁴ Yet, as noted above, neither of these seem plausible for either the moral or epistemic domains. As such, we might think that these “irreducibility-based” arguments for the moral error theory also generalise to an epistemic error theory.

Further arguments for the commitment of moral judgers to the existence of irreducibly normative relations include the apparent *difference in kind* between moral relations and non-normative relations (Parfir, 2011, 324), and the behaviour of moral judgment in the context of *cross-community disagreement* (Streumer, 2017, p. 55). Again, it is argued that these apply equally in the epistemic domain (Cuneo, 2007; Das, 2016; Rowland, 2013; Streumer, 2017). I can't assess these claims in detail here. But if they are correct then:

B. If moral judgers are committed to irreducibly normative relations, then so are epistemic judgers.

When we put (A) and (B) together, epistemic judgments fare well with regard to the companionship question.

Epistemic judgments also fare well with respect to the costliness question. This is because the consequences of an epistemic error theory are potentially drastic. This point is forcefully articulated by Cuneo (2007, Chapter 5). If an epistemic error theory were true, then there would be no epistemic reason to believe it or anything else. In addition to this, there would arguably be no “epistemic merits or demerits,” properties such as justification, understanding, foolishness, or unreliability. It is arguably a consequence of this that the epistemic error theory would entail global scepticism (Rowland, 2013). A more contentious claim is that the epistemic error theory would entail that there could be no evidential support relations, and hence no valid arguments. This would be the case if and only if evidential support relations entailed the existence of normative, epistemic relations. I will return to this below.

4 | THE EPISTEMIC ANALOGY ASSESSED

The argument that we are working with is the following:

- 1 If the moral error theory is true, then the epistemic error theory is true.
- 2 The epistemic error theory is false.
- 3 The moral error theory is false (1, 2).

We have seen that both of the premises of this argument are *prima facie* plausible. But both have also been challenged.

4.1 | Challenging Premise 1

One might argue that epistemic reasons, unlike moral reasons, are merely *institutional*: They are akin to the reasons generated by sports, games, or etiquette. If this is true, then 1 is false, at least when applied to categoricity-based arguments for the moral error theory. This way of thinking about epistemic reasons is most readily understood within the Quinean tradition of understanding epistemology as “the technology of truth-seeking,” where this (truth-seeking) is an enterprise that, like a sport or game, there is not necessarily any reason to engage in (see Quine, 1998). The comparison between epistemic reasons and those of sports and games has been made explicitly in the recent literature by, amongst others, David Papineau (2013)⁵:

Your best move may be that you ought to move your queen. But [this does not] carry genuine prescriptive force. I say the same about epistemic evaluations. (p. 69)

This approach to epistemic normativity is naturally paired with a reductive account of epistemic reasons. It therefore pressures Premise 1 in the context of both categoricity-based *and* irreducibility-based arguments for the moral error theory. The reductive account in question identifies epistemic reason-relations with *evidential-support* relations (Jenkins, 2007). The evidential-support relation is, in turn, typically identified with the *probability-raising* relation.

In order for this to warrant rejection of 1, we would need to show that no analogous reduction is available in the moral domain. One important argument for this owes to Chris Heathwood (2009). According to Heathwood, the identification of epistemic relations with evidential-support relations passes the *open-question argument test*, whilst identifications of moral relations with non-normative relations does not. It is a *closed* question, Heathwood thinks, whether, given that one proposition is evidence for another, the former is also an epistemic reason to believe the latter. Hence, there is no barrier to an analytic identification of epistemic relations with non-normative evidential-support relations (analogous to the barrier that Moore erected in the moral domain).⁶

This poses a real threat to Premise 1. But it also faces challenges. One is whether the proposed reductive base of epistemic relations is in fact non-normative.⁷ To see this more clearly, focus on a specific proposed reductive analysis of a candidate epistemic property, epistemic reasonability:

*It is reasonable for S to believe that p = It is likely that p is true, given S's background information.*⁸

There are a number of distinct ways in which normative relations could enter into the reductive base.⁹ Firstly, we can ask *how* likely p's truth must be. One obvious response to this is in explicitly normative terms: sufficiently likely that it would be permissible for S to believe it. If we do this, normative materials have entered into the reductive base. Secondly, we can ask how S's background information should be specified. One candidate here is that S's background information consists in the set of propositions that S is in a position to know, or knows, or justifiably believes. Again, one might worry that normative materials have now entered into the reductive base.¹⁰ Thirdly, we can ask what likelihood-raising relations themselves actually are. In the above reduction the relevant kind of likelihood is *conditional epistemic probability* (Kelly, 2007; Kyriacou & Cuneo, Forthcoming). It is plausible that this is best understood in terms of the credences of reasonable believers (Plantinga, 1993). Again, normative materials have now entered into the reductive base.

4.2 | Epistemic error theory is true

Premise 2 has also been challenged: Some moral error theorists simply accept that the epistemic error theory is true (Olson, 2014; Streumer, 2017). Their argument relies on distinguishing between normative relations, such as that of being a reason for belief, and *evidential relations*. With this distinction in place, the most implausible consequences of the epistemic error theory can be avoided. For example, whilst there will be no *reason* to believe the epistemic error theory, there can still be strong—indeed decisive—evidence for it.

This response runs into two main problems. The first is as set-out in Section 4.1 above. Epistemic error theorists rely on a non-normative understanding of evidence. But it is unclear that they are entitled to this in a form that would genuinely mitigate the worst of the epistemic error theory, given the problems sketched above. A second problem for the epistemic error theorist is to explain the consistency of the epistemic error theory with the nature of belief itself. It is often claimed that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a constitutive normative relation to truth (Shah, 2011; Wedgwood, 2007). If so, the epistemic error theory is potentially incompatible with any belief ascriptions. This is because in ascribing a belief one is conceptually committed to the instantiation of a normative, epistemic relation.

Responses to this challenge vary. One is to deny that the concept of belief is constitutively normative. The problem with this is that the existence of a constitutive normative relation between belief and truth is often thought

to explain otherwise puzzling phenomena in the philosophy of mind and language, including the transparency of belief (Shah, 2003) and Moore-paradoxical sentences.¹¹ A second response is to claim that the normative relations entailed by the nature of belief are reducible. In taking this line, one faces the burden of providing a plausible reduction (see Olson, 2014, p. 167). A third, more radical response is to accept an error theory of belief ascriptions. The resulting burden is to explain the compatibility of this radical response with ordinary views about the nature of thought and action.

The above summary is brief and incomplete. Whilst the analogy with epistemic judgment certainly pressures the moral error theory, a satisfactory assessment requires resolving difficult questions about the nature of normative reductionism, probability and belief.¹² As such, this CIG strategy certainly does not provide us with *stable ground* from which to assess the moral error theory.

5 | ALTERNATIVE NORMATIVE COMPANIONS: PRUDENCE AND AESTHETICS

Epistemic judgment is not the only kind of normative judgment. We can also think about prudential judgment in this way. Prudential judgments are judgments about what one ought to do, or has reason to do, or what it would be good for one to do, from the perspective of one's own well-being (as opposed to morality). This can be used to generate a CIG argument. For example (Fletcher, 2017),

- 1 If moral error theory is true, then a prudential error theory is true.
- 2 Prudential error theory isn't true.
- 3 Moral error theory isn't true (1, 2).

The first premise is immediately contestable. It is often thought that our prudential reasons are dependent on our desires in a sense that our moral reasons are not. This could undermine Premise 1. Suppose, for example, that I judge that taking up swimming would be good for you. Perhaps I am merely committed to the fact that taking up swimming would promote some of your desires. If so, then I am arguably committed to neither categorical reasons, nor irreducibly normative relations. So 1 is false.

This quick response, however, is problematic. Firstly, desire-satisfaction views of well-being are not obviously extensionally adequate. Adapted desires in socially and politically unjust environments, uninformed desires, past desires, and desires concerning one's future self provide familiar problems for the extensional adequacy of these views.¹³ Secondly, even if a desire-satisfaction view is correct, this may not establish a disanalogy that warrants rejection of 1. Desire-satisfaction theories are arguably best understood as claiming that desire-satisfaction properties provide the non-normative subvening base for normative well-being properties. But if this is correct, then why should we think that there is better prospect for reduction of normative well-being properties than for reduction of moral properties? It is not obvious that we should. After all, moral properties presumably have a descriptive supervenience base too. So we would need an *additional argument* to think that the prospects for reducing normative well-being properties are superior to those for reducing moral properties (additional, that is, to the existence of a supervenience relation between well-being and desire-satisfaction).

The real challenge for a defender of the analogy with prudential judgment concerns the costliness question. Moral error theorists are likely to accept the prudential error theory without regarding this as weakening their overall view. This marks a potential point of contrast with epistemic judgment. The consequences of an epistemic error theory appear more drastic. This potential point of difference is, however, contested. For example, Fletcher (2017) writes:

[E]pistemic error theory entails that no belief is ... more justified than another ... prudential error theory entails ... no outcome is any better ... for someone than another. Thus, it is as bad to be committed to [either]. (p. 7)

But the entailment is contestable. The epistemic error theory would not merely commit us to unintuitive first-order epistemic judgments (though it would do this). It would potentially have far-reaching consequences elsewhere, including for the tenability of the sciences. More extreme consequences could include the inability to explain thought and action (if belief is constitutively normative), and perhaps even its own incoherence if, as has been argued, global scepticism would, if true, be incoherent or unstatable (Button, 2013, Chapter 12). None of these consequences, nor analogues of them, would obviously follow from a prudential error theory.

A similar point can be made with respect to companions in guilt arguments that take *aesthetic judgment* as a companion. Here too, even if aesthetic realists can make a plausible case that aesthetic judgment is no more dependent on our conative states than moral judgment (Hanson, Forthcoming), the real challenge is to show that an aesthetic error theory is more implausible or costly than a moral error theory. Defenders of either prudential or aesthetic CIG arguments may respond to this challenge by denying its dialectical presupposition: CIG arguments needn't have suasive force against moral error theorists in order to be sound. True. But their potential to do so is surely one of their primary sources of appeal and importance.

6 | MATHEMATICS AND MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY

The analogy between morality and mathematics in philosophy is a very old one. It is no less important in contemporary philosophy and is often appealed to as part of CIG strategies that target moral scepticism.

Many contemporary metaethicists defend the view that moral facts are causally inefficacious with respect to the natural world ("non-natural realism"). This is sometimes thought to lead to epistemological problems with respect to our moral beliefs, at the extreme meriting moral scepticism (Mackie, 1977). The problem—in the first instance at least—is to explain how our moral beliefs could be reliable, given the lack of any causal connection between them and the facts to which they refer. If no explanation can be given, sceptical conclusions are sometimes drawn.¹⁴

This problem is often claimed to have a mathematical analogue (Putnam, 2002). Mathematical properties—standardly conceived—are also causally inefficacious with respect to the natural world. Indeed, the challenge to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs has been independently developed by Benacerraf (1973) and Hartry Field (2005). As such, we might expect that the following is true:

Mathematical Analogy : If moral non-naturalism entails moral scepticism, then, mathematical scepticism is true.

If we add to this the prima facie reasonable assumption that mathematical scepticism is not true—that we do have some mathematical knowledge—the result is a CIG argument against moral scepticism.

I will briefly discuss two ways in which this argument has been developed and challenged in the recent literature.

6.1 | Scanlon on moral epistemology

Scanlon (2014) takes the sceptical challenge for moral non-naturalists at face value. He responds to it by providing an epistemology for morality: an explanation of how we "access" the moral truths. It is explicitly modelled on mathematics. His proposal is that

[W]e ... discover normative truths and mathematical truths simply by thinking about these subjects in the right way. (p. 70, italics mine)

In the case of mathematics, thinking about it in the right way is, Scanlon thinks, relatively unproblematic. He asks us to consider the axiom of pairing, according to which, if *a* and *b* are sets, then there is a set *c* whose members are just *a* and *b*. This, is not, Scanlon claims, a conceptual truth, but it is nevertheless "obviously true" (73). Scanlon's thought is that this approach can be generalised to the moral domain. Here too, we arrive at knowledge by thinking about things in the right way, yielding obviously true conclusions. We might, for example, arrive at the conclusion

that extreme pain is *prima facie* bad for its bearer. So the case for moral scepticism is defused via analogy with mathematical epistemology.

One interesting challenge to this—amongst many—is whether moral propositions possess the “obviousness” that some mathematical propositions appear to. The axiom of pairing, for example, may be thought *self-evident* in a way that moral knowledge is not. This is arguably further supported by contrasting the widespread nature of moral disagreement with convergence in mathematics.

This challenge has recently been explored, and rejected, by Justin Clarke-Doane (2014, 2015b). Firstly, Clarke-Doane argues, axioms in foundational mathematics may not even be *comprehensible* to non-experts, let alone self-evident. And amongst mathematical experts, they *are* the subject of disagreement. Secondly, whilst there may be some mathematical truths (typically theorems, not axioms) that are candidates for self-evidence, this is no less obvious in the moral domain:

I am not aware of any non error-theorist who rejects [1+1=2 or that 7 is prime]. But this fails to establish a disanalogy [with] morality. I am not aware of any non-error-theorist who rejects the claim that burning babies for fun is wrong, or that it is sometimes permissible for people to stand up. (Clarke-Doane, 2014, p. 241)

Clarke-Doane thereby provides some support for Scanlon-style defences of the Mathematical Analogy (whether or not he, or we, think that such defences are required to respond to the sceptical challenge).

6.2 | Street's debunking argument

Consider an alternative challenge to Mathematical Analogy. It is often thought that when we reflect on the causal origins of our moral beliefs, we should see that

Moral Insensitivity : Even if the moral facts had been different, our moral beliefs would have remained the same.

This point is well illustrated by Sharon Street's discussion of the philosophical significance of the evolutionary origins of our basic moral sentiments (Street, 2006). We would have been disposed to think it good to, for example, care for our children whether it not it in fact was. This is because of the selective advantage at which it stood us. As a result of the insensitive nature of our moral beliefs, a sceptical conclusion is drawn.

By contrast, when we reflect on the causal origins of our mathematical beliefs, we find something very different. Specifically, we find:

Mathematical Sensitivity : If the mathematical facts had been different, our mathematical beliefs would have been different too.

This point is often made by arguing that the selective advantage of mathematical beliefs depends on their being *true* (Joyce, 2006; Ruse, 1986; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006). The result is that Street's version of the epistemological challenge for moral scepticism doesn't appear to generalise to the mathematical domain. So Mathematical Analogy, and the CIG strategy, fails.

Again, Clarke-Doane has defended the analogy (Clarke-Doane, 2012, 2014, 2015a). Moral beliefs aren't insensitive after all. This is because of the modal profile of basic true moral propositions: They are *necessarily* true. It follows that there are no possible worlds in which they (i.e., the moral truths) vary, but our moral beliefs stay the same. So Moral Insensitivity is false. So this well-known challenge to Mathematical Analogy fails.

But isn't this just a trick? Even if the moral truths are *metaphysically* (and perhaps normatively) necessary, isn't it still *conceptually* possible that they could have been different? Perhaps. But this may be equally true of our mathematical beliefs. In a classic CIG manoeuvre, Clarke-Doane (2015a) writes:

[W]e seem to be equally unable to show that [true] beliefs ... are sensitive with respect to conceptually possible worlds. The mathematical case makes the point vividly. [V]irtually none of our [mathematical] beliefs is sensitive with respect to conceptually possible worlds. (p. 90–91)

As such, the conceptual possibility that our moral beliefs are insensitive could not entail moral scepticism without also entailing mathematical scepticism.

Clearly, this is not the end of the story however. Even if we concede to Clarke-Doane that moral and mathematical beliefs respectively fare equally well with respect to sensitivity, we might try to re-cast Street-style challenges: Sensitivity is, after all, not necessary and sufficient for reliability. Hence, we are not yet entitled to either Mathematical Analogy or to a rebuttal of traditional arguments for moral scepticism. In fairness to Clarke-Doane, he does not claim otherwise. Moral and mathematical beliefs are, he claims, equally good companions with respect to “safety” (“could our beliefs easily have been false?”) too. If this is correct, then Mathematical Analogy will succeed unless it can be shown that the moral reliability requires more than a safe and sensitive modal profile (see Woods, 2018).

7 | CONCLUSION

In this brief article, I have surveyed some of the wide range of CIG arguments in the current literature. There are many more arguments that I have not discussed including those that take religion, the law, and even philosophy itself as companions (Shafer-Landau, 2006). Doubtless, some of the CIG arguments in this range will be successful: They will show that at least some metaethical arguments overreach. Often, however, attempts at showing this have proved to be at least as complex and controversial as the premises of the metaethical arguments against which they are targeted. As such, it is questionable whether, in general, the CIG strategy really does provide a better basis for rejecting arguments for moral scepticism or moral error theory than would be provided by directly challenging the premises of those arguments themselves.¹⁵

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Or, alternatively, that ordinary *speech acts* presuppose that there are moral facts (Cuneo, 2014).
- ² This is the case with, for example, Cuneo's (2007) argument in *The Normative Web*. I will—in Section 3—focus on the analogical aspect of the argument.
- ³ See, for example, Lenman (2008), Fletcher (2009, 2017), Heathwood (2009), Cowie (2014, 2016), Rowland (2013, 2016), Das (2016, 2017), and Kyriacou and Cuneo (Forthcoming).
- ⁴ This kind of justification of the supposed irreducible normativity of the moral is to the fore in Olson (2014).
- ⁵ For a detailed discussion and defence, see Hazlett (2013).
- ⁶ See also Lenman (2008).
- ⁷ For useful discussion of this point, see the interchange between Thomas Kelly (2007) and Adam Leite (2007).
- ⁸ This is close to Heathwood's (2009) own formulation.
- ⁹ My arguments loosely follow those in Kyriacou and Cuneo (forthcoming).
- ¹⁰ This is actually contestable. It may be that knowledge itself is not an essentially normative property. There has been some interesting recent work on this. See Kurt Sylvan's (2017) helpful summary and argument. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this.
- ¹¹ For discussion of Shah's (2003) argument, see McHugh (2013). For discussion of the above as applied to Moore-paradoxical sentences, see Greenberg and Cowie (Forthcoming).
- ¹² A full discussion of all of these issues is in Cowie (n.d.).
- ¹³ For relevant discussion of desire-satisfaction views, see Heathwood (2011, 2016).
- ¹⁴ For a response, see Enoch (2011, Chapter 7).
- ¹⁵ I am grateful to editors and anonymous reviewers at *Philosophy Compass* for their helpful and constructive comments.

ORCID

Christopher Cowie  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2179-1254>

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Christopher Cowie is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Durham.

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